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Proof of spending in a block-chain system
Chunlei Liu∗
Abstract
We introduce proof of spending in a block-chain system. In this
system the probability for a node to create a legal block is proportional
to the total amount of coins it has spent in history.
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Satoshi Nakamoto [Na] introduced the notion of block-chain
as well as the notion of proof of work into P2P cash systems, giving
birth to the famous Bitcoin, which is the first P2P cash implemented
in practise.
A cash system is a system in which nodes transfer coins to each other.
A P2P cash system is a cash system in which transactions as well as
datum built on transactions are broadcast to all nodes. A transaction is
a collection of the following components: time of the blocktransaction,
address of the payee, amount of payment, transaction fees, unspent
transactions, the change, and signature of the payer.
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TRANSACTION
Time:
Payee:
Payment:
Tx Fee:
Unspent Tx: #1, #2, · · · , # n.
The change:
Payer’s Signature:
A block-chain system is a P2P cash system where transactions are
collected into blocks, where blocks are chained one after another, and
where only the longest block-chain is considered to be the correct one.
A block in a block-chain system is a collection of the following com-
ponents: time of the block, hash of the previous block, new transactions
added to the block, address of the block creator, nonce such that the
hash of the block begins with a number of zero bits.
BLOCK
Time:
Tx:#1, #2, · · · , # n.
Prev. Hash:
Nonce:
Creator:
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Let D be a natural number. A proof of work system with target
difficulty D is a block-chain system where block B must satisfy satisfies
the threshold:
nlz(hash(B)) ≥ D.
Here nlz(hash(B)) denotes the number of leading zero bits of hash(B).
The expected time for a CPU to find a POW block is ≈ 2D. And the
expected time for r CPUs to find a POW block is ≈ 2
D
r
. Therefore it is
very difficult for the adversary to build the longest block-chain unless
he has more CPUs than the honest party.
In 2011, the notion of proof of stake was posted in bitcoin forum by
a user named Quantunmechanic. Various proof of stake systems were
then formulated, see, e.g. [KN,BGM,NXT,Mi,BPS,DGKR,KRDO].
The simplest proof of stake system is the proof of balance system. A
proof of balance system with target difficulty D is a block-chain system
where block B chained after block-chain C by node A must satisfy the
threshold:
nlz(hash(B)) ≥ D − log2(1 + bal(A;C)),
where bal(A;C) is the balance of node A in block-chain C.
The expected time for a party to find a POB block chained to block-
chain C is ≈ 2
D
Bal , where Bal is the balance of the party in block-chain
C. Suppose that the party transfers no coins to nodes outside the
party, and assume that the transaction fees paid by the party in every
block is a constant, say FPB. Then the expected time for the party to
build a long POB block-chain of length L is ≈ 2
D logL
Rwd−FPB , where Rwd
is the coins rewarded to a block creator. Thus, the expected time for a
party without spending to build a long POB block-chain of length L is
≈
2D logL
Rwd . It follows that, the adversary who never spends his coins can
build a long block-chain secretely which in a long run, would outpace
the block-chain maintained by the honest party. The same philosophy
can be applied to attack other kinds of proof of stake systems, see,
e.g. [Bu,Po].
In this paper we present a proof of spending system. In this system
the expected time for a node to create a block is inverse proportional
to the total amount of the coins it has spent in history. We shall see
that, in the proof of spending system, the adversary trying to build a
longest block-chain would earn nothing.
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2 PROOF OF SPENDING
We now present a proof of spending system.
The proof of spending system with target difficulty D is a block-
chain system where block B chained after block-chain C by node A
must satisfy the threshold:
nlz(hash(B)) ≥ D − log2(1 + spn(A;C)),
where spn(A,C) is the total amount of coins spent by node A in block-
chain C.
We call a block in a proof of spending system a PSP block. One can
prove the following.
Lemma 2.1 The expected time for a party to find a PSP block chained
after block-chain C is ≈ 2
D
Spn , where Spn is the amount of coins spent
by the party in block-chain C.
We now prove the following.
Lemma 2.2 Suppose that a party is going to build a long PSP block-
chain, and assume that no nodes outside the party would transfer coins
to the party. Then the coins spent per block by the party is ≤ RwdFPC ,
where FPC is the amount of transaction fees per coin.
Proof. Suppose that the contrary is true. Let SPB be the amount of
coins spent per block by the party Then whenever the party produces a
PSP block, the balance of the party decreases at least by SPB×FPC−
Rwd > 0. This would forbid the party to build a long block-chain, and
thus contradicts to the assumption of the lemma. The lemma is proved.
We now prove the following.
Theorem 2.3 Suppose that the coins spent by a party in every block
is RwdFPC ·WR, where WR ≤ 1 is a positive constant. Then the expected
time for the party to build a long PSP block-chain of length L is
≈
2D
WR
·
FPC
Rwd
· (γ + logL),
where γ is the Euler constant.
Proof. Since the coins spent by the party in the first i blocks of the
block-chain is i · RwdFPC ·WR, the expected time for the party to produce
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the (i + 1)-th block is ≈ 2
D
WR ·
FPC
Rwd ·
1
i
. So the expected time for the
party to build a long block-chain of length L is
≈
2D
WR
·
FPC
Rwd
L∑
i=1
1
i
≈
2D
WR
·
FPC
Rwd
· (γ + logL).
The theorem is proved.
Note that at the growing stages of the network, a proof of spending
system is nearly a proof of work system, and hence is secure. After
the network is grown up, the coins spent by the honest party in every
block is ≈ RwdFPC . Suppose that the adversary wants to build a long PSP
block-chain in shortest time. His best strategy is to transfer RwdFPC ·WR
coins to himself in every block with WR < 1. Therefore it is difficult
for the adversary to built the longest block-chain alone.
3 PROOF OF RECENT SPENDING
We now present a proof of recent spending system.
Let F be a natural number. The proof of recent spending system
with target difficulty D and freshness F is a block-chain system where
block B chained after block-chain C by node A must satisfy the thresh-
old:
nlz(hash(B)) ≥ D − log2(1 + spn(A;C
[F ])),
where C [F ] is the last segment of C of length F , and spn(A,C [F ]) is
the total amount of coins spent by node A in the chain segment C [F ].
We call a block in a proof of recent spending system a PRS block.
As in the last section, we can prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.1 The expected time for a party to find a PRS block chained
after block-chain C is ≈ 2
D
RS , where RS is the amount of coins spent by
the party in chain segment C [F ].
Lemma 3.2 Suppose that a party is going to build a long PRS block-
chain, and assume that no nodes outside the party would transfer coins
to the party. Then the coins spent per block by the party is ≤ RwdFPC ,
where FPC is the amount of transaction fees per coin.
We now prove the following.
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Theorem 3.3 Suppose that the coins spent by a party in every block
is RwdFPC ·WR, where WR ≤ 1 is a positive constant. Then the expected
time for the party to build a long PRS block-chain of length L is
≈
2D
F
·
FPC
Rwd
·
1
WR
· L.
Proof. We have, when C is long,
spn(A,C [E]) = F ·
Rwd
FPC
·WR.
So, when i is large, the expected time for the party to produce the i-th
block is
≈
2D
F
·
FPC
Rwd
·
1
WR
.
So the expected time for the party to build a long block-chain of length
L is
≈
2D
F
·
FPC
Rwd
·
1
WR
· L.
The theorem is proved.
Suppose that the adversary wants to build a long PRS block-chain
alone in shortest time. His best strategy is to transfer RwdFPC ·WR coins
to himself in every block with WR close to 1. The transaction fees he
must pay in very block is Rwd ·WR. So he earns Rwd · (1−WR) per
block. As the time for him to create a block is
≈
2D
F
·
FPC
Rwd
·
1
WR
,
his earning, per unit time, is
≈
F
2D
·
Rwd2
FPC
·WR(1−WR),
which is very small. It follows that the proof of recent spending system
is secure, and is very secure if
F
2D
·
Rwd2
FPC
is small.
4 SPENDING OF OLD COINS
We now present a proof of spending of old coins system.
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We begin with the definition of coin age. The age of coin in a block
chain is defined to be the length from the last transaction of the coin
to the end of the block chain. The age of coin co in block-chain C is
denoted as age(co;C).
Let E be a natural number. The proof of spending of old coins sys-
tem with target difficulty D and experience E is a block-chain system
where block B chained after block-chain C by node A must satisfy the
threshold:
nlz(hash(B)) ≥ D − log2(1 + spn(A;C,E)),
where spn(A,C,E) is the total amount of coins of age at least E spent
by node A in the block-chain C.
We call a block in a proof of spending of old coins system a PSO
block. As in the last section, we can prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.1 The expected time for a party to find a PSO block chained
after block-chain C is ≈ 2
D
SO , where SO is the amount of coins of age
at least E spent by the party in block-chain C.
Lemma 4.2 Suppose that a party is going to build a long PSO block-
chain, and assume that no nodes outside the party would transfer coins
to the party. Then the coins spent per block by the party is ≤ RwdFPC ,
where FPC is the amount of transaction fees per coin.
We now prove the following.
Theorem 4.3 Suppose that the coins spent by a party in every block
is RwdFPC ·WR, where WR ≤ 1 is a positive constant. Then the expected
time for the party to build a long PSO block-chain of length L is
≈ 2D ·
FPC
Rwd
·
1
WR
· logL.
Proof. We have, when C is long,
spn(A;C,E) ≈ len(C) ·
Rwd
FPC
·WR,
where len(C) is the length of C. So the expected time for the party to
build a block-chain of length L is
≈
L∑
i=1
2D
i
·
FPC
Rwd
·
1
WR
≈ 2D ·
FPC
Rwd
·
1
WR
· logL.
The theorem is proved.
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Suppose that the adversary wants to build a long PRS block-chain
alone in shortest time. His best strategy is to transfer RwdFPC ·WR coins
to himself in every block with WR close to 1. His balance must be
greater than E · RwdFPC ·WR. If E ≥
FPC
Rwd ·CN, where CN is the coins of
the network, then the balance of the adversary must be greater than
CN ·WR. It follows that the proof of spending of old coins is secure if
E is large.
5 RECENT SPENDING OF OLD COINS
We now present a proof of recent spending of old coins system.
The proof of recent spending of old coins system with target difficulty
D, freshness F and experience E is a block-chain system where block
B chained after block-chain C by node A must satisfy the threshold:
nlz(hash(B)) ≥ D − log2(1 + spn(A;C
[F ], E)),
where spn(A,C [F ], E) is the total amount of coins of age at least E
spent by node A in the segment C [F ].
We call a block in a proof of spending of old coins system a RSO
block. As in the last section, we can prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 5.1 The expected time for a party to find a RSO block chained
after block-chain C is ≈ 2
D
SO , where SO is the amount of coins of age
at least E spent by the party in segment C [F ].
Lemma 5.2 Suppose that a party is going to build a long RSO block-
chain, and assume that no nodes outside the party would transfer coins
to the party. Then the coins spent per block by the party is ≤ RwdFPC ,
where FPC is the amount of transaction fees per coin.
We now prove the following.
Theorem 5.3 Suppose that the coins spent by a party in every block
is RwdFPC ·WR, where WR ≤ 1 is a positive constant. Then the expected
time for the party to build a long RSO block-chain of length L is
≈
2D
F
·
FPC
Rwd
·
1
WR
· L.
Proof. We have, when C is long,
spn(A;C,E[F ]) ≈ F ·
Rwd
FPC
·WR.
So the expected time for the party to build a block-chain of length L
is
≈
2D
F
·
FPC
Rwd
·
1
WR
· L.
The theorem is proved.
Suppose that the adversary wants to build a long PRS block-chain
alone in shortest time. His best strategy is to transfer RwdFPC ·WR coins
to himself in every block with WR close to 1. His balance must be
greater than E · RwdFPC ·WR. If E ≥
FPC
Rwd ·CN, where CN is the coins of
the network, then the balance of the adversary must be greater than
CN ·WR. The transaction fees he must pay in very block is Rwd ·WR.
So he earns Rwd · (1 −WR) per block. As the time for him to create
a block is
≈
2D
F
·
FPC
Rwd
·
1
WR
,
his earning, per unit time, is
≈
F
2D
·
Rwd2
FPC
·WR(1−WR),
which is very small. It follows that the proof of recent spending system
is secure, and is very secure if
F
2D
·
Rwd2
FPC
is small. It follows that the proof of spending of old coins is secure if
E is large.
6 CONCLUSION
We have proposed two block-chain systems: proof of spending and
proof of recent spending. The proof of spending system is more effi-
cient, and the proof of recent spending system is more secure.
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